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ARTIFICIALLY AFFECTING MARKET
ACTIVITY THROUGH LOCK-UP
AGREEMENTS-MANIPULATION UNDER
SECTION 14(e): DATA PROBE
ACQUISITION CORP. V. DATATAB, INC.
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act (the Act)1 prohibits any per-
son from "engag[ing] in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer."'2 In light of
section 14(e), some courts and commentators recently have ques-
tioned the validity of various defensive tactics s employed by target
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
2 Id. § 78n(e). Section 14(e) of the Williams Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to pre-
vent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Although neither Congress nor the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion has defined "tender offer" for purposes of the Williams Act, see, e.g., Smallwood v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); L. SODER-
QUIST, SEcuRTIEs REGULATION 487 (1982), there is general recognition that a tender offer is a
proposal by a bidding corporation to purchase for cash, stock or a combination thereof, a
controlling percentage of the outstanding shares of another corporation, at a price usually
above the current market price of the stock, 2 B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE AcQUISIrlONS
AND MERGERS § 27.01, at 27-4 (1982); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 317 (1967); Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by
Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Stanford Note]. Generally, the offeror's obligation to purchase is conditioned
on the tendering of a minimum number of shares within a specified time period. W. CARY &
M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ComoPATIONS 905 (5th ed. 1980); Note, The Devel-
oping Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HRv. L.
REv. 1250, 1251-52 (1973).
' The board of directors of a target company may employ various tactics to oppose an
unfriendly or unsolicited bid. 1 A. FLEiscHER, JR., TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES,
AND PLANNING 291 (1983). Defensive actions that may be undertaken include communica-
tions campaigns with shareholders, placement of stock in friendly hands, execution of a de-
fensive merger with a white knight, institution of legal proceedings, increases in outstanding
stock, dividend increases, stock splits, corporate purchase of its own shares, acquisitions to
create antitrust problems, creation of contractual obstacles, charter and bylaw amendments,
19841 SECTION 14(e) MANIPULATION
management to defeat hostile takeover bids.4 In particular, lock-up
options, which permit the purchase of a substantial percentage of a
corporation's stock or assets, 5 and which are granted by target
management to one tender offeror, have been challenged by com-
peting tender offerors as "manipulative acts or practices" under
this section.6 Recently, in Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v.
Datatab, Inc.,7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused
to enjoin a 1-year option granted by target management to a com-
peting tender offeror for shares equivalent to 200% of the target's
outstanding stock, and held that section 14(e) of the Williams Act
did not empower federal courts "to review the substantive validity
of corporate actions undertaken during the course of a tender
offer."8
In Data Probe, Data Probe Acquisition Corporation (Data
and sale of attractive assets. Id. at 297-387; 1 M. LnPrON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEoVERS AND
FREEzEouTs 271-305 (1978); Stanford Note, supra note 2, at 1109-26.
4 See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981); see also
Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CoRNELL L.
REV. 901, 911 (1979) (disclosure is of little value if target management effectively can de-
prive stockholders of their choice); Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the
Williams Act's Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAN. L. REv. 1087, 1128-29 (1982)
(arrangements effectuating artificial market conditions are manipulative for purposes of sec-
tion 14(e)); cf. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 949 (N.D. IlM. 1982) (no § 14(e)
violation since target management's actions did not create artificial price ceiling and hence
did not produce an absolute lock-up of the kind that confronted the Marathon court). The
majority of courts, however, have persisted in interpreting section 14(e) as affording strictly
procedural safeguards against disclosure violations. See infra note 37 and accompanying
text.
5 Lock-ups are made in conjunction with a proposed offer, and provide the offeror an
advantage over potential or competing bidders. Fraidin & Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements,
14 REv. SEC. REG. 821, 821 (1981). A lock-up increases an offeror's possibility of success,
creates obstacles for other competitors, id., and permits the bidder to maintain his original
price, Note, The Future of Lock-Ups After Mobil v. Marathon Oil, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 261,
265 (1983). In addition, lock-ups provide target companies with advantages in negotiating
with white knights when one is sought in response to a hostile tender offer. Note, Lock-Up
Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1068, 1068 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Harvard Note]; Note, supra, at 266. Typical of the lock-up arrangements granted to
friendly offerors or white knights by target management were those granted in Mobil Corp.
v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981) (stock option and purchase option for
"crown jewel" asset). For a discussion of the Marathon options and their ramifications, see
infra note 19.
6 See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 368 (6th
Cir. 1981); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 627 (D. Md. 1982);
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Whittaker Corp. v.
Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 947 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
7 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. _, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
8 Id. at 4.
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Probe) announced a cash tender offer for the stock of Datatab, In-
corporated (Datatab) at $1.25 per share, conditioned on the failure
of an earlier announced merger proposal between Datatab and
CRC Acquisition Corporation (CRC).9 Under that agreement, CRC
would initiate a tender offer at $1.00 per share, upon completion of
which Datatab would be merged into a wholly-owned subsidiary of
CRC. 10 In addition, three of Datatab's officer-directors were to be
signed to 3-year employment contracts with CRC. 1" After unsuc-
cessful negotiations with the president of Data Probe, intended to
secure personal employment contracts similar to those stipulated
in the CRC agreement, the Datatab directors conducted further
negotiations with CRC which resulted in a revised merger agree-
ment. 2 The second proposed merger included a price increase for
shareholders from $1.00 to $1.40 per share and granted CRC an
irrevocable 1-year option to purchase 1,407,674 authorized but
unissued shares at the same price.' 3 Data Probe countered with an
offer of $1.55 per share, contingent on the invalidation of the CRC
option.14 Thereafter, Data Probe sought to enjoin CRC from exer-
cising its option,'5 alleging that the option constituted a manipula-
0 Id. at 2-3. Datatab scheduled a shareholders' meeting to obtain two-thirds approval of
the merger as required by New York law. Id. at 2. Two days before the scheduled meeting,
Data Probe announced its tender offer. Id.
10 Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1541 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. .. , 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1542. After Data Probe announced its tender offer, a meeting was arranged
between Yitzhak Bachana, president of Data Probe, and Sanford Adams, president of
Datatab. Id. During their negotiations, Adams inquired as to the employment arrangements
Bachana would be willing to make in regard to Datatab's officers. Id. The trial record indi-
cated that Bachana was willing to consider salaries comparable to those agreed to by CRC,
but considered a commitment on a specific figure or duration of employment premature. Id.
Testimony at the trial indicated that Adams would have been cooperative in a takeover
attempt only if he received the contract guarantees he sought. Id.
13 722 F.2d at 3.
14 Id. If exercised, the option would invest CRC with two-thirds majority control of
Datatab regardless of the number of shares tendered to Data Probe by Datatab sharehold-
ers. Id.
18 Id. at 2. The court assumed without deciding that a tender offeror has standing to
seek injunctive relief against the target company or other competitors in the tender offer
contest, reasoning that such a determination would not affect the outcome of the case. Id. at
4 n.2. Whether a tender offeror has standing to seek injunctive relief under section 14(e) has
not been addressed by the Supreme Court. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 47
n.33 (1977). In Piper, the Court held that there was no implied action for damages for a
tender offeror since the Act was intended to provide protection only for investors. Id. at 35.
The Court, however, offered "no view upon whether as a general proposition a suit in equity
for injunctive relief, as distinguished from an action for damages, would lie in favor of a
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tive act or practice in violation of section 14(e) of the Williams
Act."'
The district court granted Data Probe's request to enjoin the
option agreement. 17 Judge Sofaer, relying on the Sixth Circuit's in-
terpretation of the phrase "manipulative device" in Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co.'s as a defensive tactic that "not only artificially
affect[s], but for all practical purposes completely block[s], normal
healthy market activity,"' 9 concluded that the option was manipu-
lative within the meaning of the Act because it directly interfered
with the shareholders' right to tender their shares freely in the
market, effectively terminating all further bidding. 0
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, stating that the tech-
nical definition given to manipulation in the context of section
tender offeror under... 14(e)." Id. at 47 n.33 (emphasis added). Yet, as noted by the dis-
trict court, see 568 F. Supp. at 1544 n.1, the Piper Court observed that "in corporate control
contests the stage of preliminary injunctive relief, rather than post-contest lawsuits, is the
time when relief can best be given," 430 U.S. at 42. The Court apparently decided to deny
an offeror standing to sue for damages on the ground that a monetary award could be detri-
mental to shareholder interests. Id. Injunctive relief granted to an offeror, however, "may
often be the only means to provide adequate assurance that [the corporate] shareholders
have a fully informed, free choice." Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th
Cir. 1981). In Marathon, the Sixth Circuit observed that injunctive relief would protect
shareholders by requiring management and competing tender offerors to make complete dis-
closure. 669 F.2d at 372; see Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613,
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Data Probe, 568 F. Supp. at 1544 (tender offeror may be the
only party with enough knowledge to identify violations in time to obtain injunction and
protect shareholders in process).
16 722 F.2d at 3. In addition to allegations of § 14(e) violations, Data Probe alleged that
Datatab had violated § 14(a), 568 F. Supp. at 1541, by failing to disclose to its shareholders
the implications of the option agreement with respect to CRC's ultimate power to approve
the merger and its effect on any further bidding, id. at 1543.
17 568 F. Supp. at 1541. After the district court granted the injunction, Data Probe
went forward with its tender offer, receiving over 60% of Datatab's outstanding stock. 722
F.2d at 3-4.
18 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
19 Id. at 374. In Marathon, target management granted two options to a competing
offeror in an attempt to deter Mobil Corporation from continuing its offer. Id. at 367. The
first option was an irrevocable stock option for 10 million authorized but unissued shares of
Marathon common stock, the equivalent of 17% of all outstanding stock. Id. The second
option, exercisable only if a third party gained control of Marathon, was a purchase option
for Marathon's interest in Yates Field, "[o]ne of the world's most remarkable oil fields" and
undisputably Marathon's most valuable asset. Id. at 367. The Yates option, the court con-
cluded, effectively frustrated any rival tender offers, and, thus, created an artificial ceiling
on the price of the stock. Id. at 375.
10 568 F. Supp. at 1561-62. The district court stated that the Act imposed two primary
obligations on tender offerors and target companies: disclosure of information to sharehold-
ers and avoidance of conduct that might hamper a shareholder's decisionmaking in the dis-
position of his property. Id. at 1545.
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5-"artificially affecting market activity in or-
der to mislead investors" 21-was equally applicable to section
14(e).2 2 Judge Winter reasoned that federal jurisdiction under sec-
tion 14(e) did not extend to claims that target management took
action during a tender offer that foreclosed a competitive market,
since such conduct pertains to the fairness of a transaction, and is
subject, therefore, solely to traditional state-law fiduciary stan-
dards.23 The court, rejecting Marathon as an" 'unwarranted exten-
sion of the Williams Act,' '124 concluded that, absent misrepresen-
tation, a cause of action under section 14(e) based on corporate
actions during a tender offer does not lie.25 Accordingly, the court
reasoned, the fairness or unfairness of a particular corporate action
taken during a tender offer, such as granting a stock or asset op-
tion, was irrelevant to an analysis of manipulation.26
21 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977). The Santa Fe Court, describing
manipulation as "'virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities mar-
kets,'" id. at 476 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)), stated
that the term referred to specific practices "such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices," that are intended to defraud or mislead investors by "artificially affecting market
activity," id.
22 722 F.2d at 4 (citing Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1982)).
23 722 F.2d at 4. The court's decision to deny federal jurisdiction was based primarily
on the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See id. In
Santa Fe, minority stockholders of Kirby Lumber Corp. brought an action under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 against Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,
a 95% majority shareholder, alleging fraud in the execution of a short-term merger and
seeking to set aside the merger or receive a fair value for their shares. 430 U.S. at 465-67.
Plaintiffs alleged that the merger was intended to freeze out the minority shareholders "at a
wholly inadequate price," and that Santa Fe knowingly obtained a fraudulent appraisal of
the stock from an independent investment banking firm. Id. at 467. The Court held, how-
ever, that § 10(b) did not apply to "instances of corporate mismanagement. . . in which the
essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary." 430 U.S.
at 477. In line with the Supreme Court's language, the Second Circuit considered the es-
sence of the plaintiffs' claim to be breach of fiduciary duty by target management. 722 F.2d
at 4. The court, in declining to accept jurisdiction of the case, stated that entertainment of
traditional state law claims would lead to "a federal common law of fiduciary obligations."
Id.
It should be noted, however, that the Santa Fe Court further opined that federal courts
"could be expected to depart from state fiduciary standards at least to the extent necessary
to ensure uniformity within the federal system ... where federal law expressly requires
certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders." 430 U.S. at 479.
24 722 F.2d at 5 (quoting Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983)).
25 722 F.2d at 4 (citing Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 951 (1980)).
26 722 F.2d at 4; see also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983).
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The Data Probe decision permits target management to em-
ploy any lock-up option or other defensive tactic designed to set a
price ceiling on the target company's shares-and thereby affect
market activity-as long as such actions meet the disclosure re-
quirements of the 1934 Act. It is submitted that certain defensive
tactics, especially stock or asset options conditioned on the success
of a competing tender offer, constitute manipulative acts pro-
scribed by section 14(e) of the Williams Act.2 In support of this
conclusion, this Comment first will examine the legislative history
of the Williams Act as a means of understanding the ends Con-
gress sought in regulating the tender offer field. The Comment
then will discuss the Sixth Circuit's decision in Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Corp. and the evolving judicial philosophy that sup-
ports the proposition that informed investor decisions cannot
properly be protected without substantive federal regulation. Fi-
nally, the Comment will conclude that defensive tactics that are
intended to create a ceiling on the price of a target's stock, and
thus, artificially to affect market activity, are manipulative acts,
notwithstanding the absence of misrepresentation or nondis-
closure.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
In determining the reach of section 14(e), courts have referred
to the Act's legislative history s for aid in understanding the sec-
tion's largely undefined language.29 The evolution of the proposed
27 For a comprehensive list of defensive tactics employed by target management after a
tender offer has been made, see Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal
Propriety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYaAcusE L. R.v. 977, 985-86
(1983). This Comment does not suggest that all defensive tactics are violative of the Wil-
liams Act. This Comment does advocate, however, that federal courts entertain claims that
a party engaging in defensive tactics intended to affect market prices so as to foreclose
competitive bidding during the course of a tender offer. Such a standard does not, obviously,
permit the labeling of any one defensive tactic as a per se violation of § 14(e). On the con-
trary, this standard must be applied against any and all defensive maneuvers on a case-by-
case basis.
Us See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22-35 (1977); Data Probe Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1543-48 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310,
1319-21 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
" In drafting the Williams Act, Congress provided a skeletal guideline to permit broad-
based application to accommodate future developments in the tender offer field. Full Dis-
closure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeovers Bids, Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Banking and Currency Comm., 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1967) (statement of Manuel Cohen, Chairman, Securities Exchange Commis-
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bill from its original anti-takeover nature"° to its policy of neutral-
ity offers significant evidence of Congress' intent to protect inves-
tors debating whether and to which bidder to tender their shares. 1
Congress, however, favored neither target management nor tender
offeror. 2 In fact, Congress recognized that tender offers often were
beneficial in combating "inefficient but entrenched management,"
and concluded that such offers should not be discouraged."s Con-
sion) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Significantly, Congress declined to define
tender offer. L. SODERQUIST, supra note 2, at 487 (1982). Two prominenV commentators rea-
son that the failure to define the term was not an oversight, but instead was attributable to
a desire on the part of Congress and the SEC to preserve the flexibility necessary for ad hoc
determinations. E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 69-70
(1973). It is suggested that the drafters contemplated that the general terms in the provision
be endowed with similar elasticity. See Senate Hearings, supra, at 16 (remarks of Manuel
Cohen) (need for effective tools to deal with progressive techniques of takeover offensive
and defensive strategy).
30 Introduced by Senator Williams, and entitled "Protection Against Corporate Raid-
ers," the proposed bill was intended to regulate the conduct of "evil" tender offerors. See
111 CONG. REc. 28257-58 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams); see also 113 CONG. Rc. 857
(1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel).
31 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Originally designed to guard against
"corporate raiders," the bill was "substantially revised." 113 CONG. RPc. 854 (1967) (re-
marks of Sen. Williams). In its final draft, the Act was "designed to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and man-
agement equal opportunity to fairly present their case." H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1968). By implementing a neutral policy, Congress acknowledged that target man-
agement, as well as offerors, should be subject to regulation since both sides may "attempt
to manipulate the public security holders to their own advantage." See Full Disclosure of
Corporate Equity, Hearings on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) (statement of Manuel Cohen).
31 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report].
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois Business Take-
over Act, which imposed obligations and constraints on bidders in addition to the require-
ments of the Williams Act, as violative of the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. 457 U.S.
at 630. Although Edgar concerned the issues of preemption and undue burden on interstate
commerce, the case is significant in its analysis of the congressional intent underlying the
Williams Act. The Court concluded that Congress, in addition to requiring adequate disclos-
ure, sought a position of "neutrality," declining to favor either target management or com-
peting bidders. Id. at 633; cf. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-60 (1975)
(Congress did not intend to give target management an advantage in opposing takeover
bids). The Court reasoned that Congress' decision to afford advantages to neither side indi-
cated a conclusion that the adequately informed investor could exercise his judgment and
choice. 457 U.S. at 633-34; see 113 CONG. RC. 24664-65 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams);
id. at 24665-66 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982); Senate Report, supra note 32, at
3. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 1161, 1194-1204 (1981) (economic ramifica-
tions of tender offers not solely within management's domain); Gilson, A Structural Ap-
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gress' objective was the dissemination of accurate information to
the shareholder to enable him to "reach a decision without being
pressured and without being subject to unwarranted techniques
...designed to prevent that from happening. 3 4 Thus, Congress
sought two principal ends: maintenance of a shareholder's right of
decision in the tender offer situation,35 and adequate disclosure to
ensure that those decisions are made intelligently.36 Although
courts have focused their attention primarily on disclosure, a pro-
cedural requirement, 37 the Act contains several specific substantive
provisions. 8 Under section 14(d), shareholders enjoy rights of
withdrawal, 39 as well as the right to receive equal consideration for
their shares40 and to have their shares taken up by the bidder on a
pro rata basis when a partial offer is oversubscribed.41
The legislative history of the Williams Act does not, standing
alone, demand the inclusion of various defensive tactics under the
rubric of "manipulative acts or practices. '42 It is suggested, how-
ever, that the congressional desire to ensure that shareholders be
given a fair opportunity to tender their shares as they choose lends
support to a reading of section 14(e) manipulation that contem-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 819, 843-45 (1981).
34 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 15 (statement of Manuel Cohen); see id. at 131
(statement of Arthur Fleischer, Jr.) (management should be prohibited from entering into
agreements that frustrate the tender offer); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634
(1982) ("Congress sought to protect the investor... by withholding from management or
the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice").
33 See supra notes 31 & 32. The legislative history of the Williams Act indicates that
the proponents of the bill reiterated their desire not to impede the investors' decision
whether to tender their shares. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 16 (remarks of
Manuel Cohen) (the Act was designed "to give the investor the fairest possible opportunity
to make his own decision"); 113 CONG. RuC. 24664-65 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams);
see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1982) (Congress sought to protect the inves-
tor without frustrating the exercise of an informed decision).
36 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982).
3, See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 550 (1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md.
1982).
" See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. See generally Weiss, supra note 4, at
1104-05 (right to receive market price).
:, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982) (withdrawal permitted within 7 days of definitive tender
offer and anytime after 60 days from original tender request).
40 Id. § 78n(d)(7) (1982) ("best price" provision--shareholders tendering before an an-
nounced increase in price must receive equal treatment).
41 Id. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); 113 CONG. Rc. 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
42 See Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84
COLUM. L. Ray. 228, 238-41 (1984).
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plates corporate activity, such as the granting of lock-up options,
intended to remove that choice.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF MANIPULATION
Manipulation Under Marathon
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,43 in which the Sixth Circuit
held that lock-up options affecting artificial changes in market
conditions are manipulative acts,44 represents a minority view-
point, and is regarded by many as an aberration among section
14(e) manipulation cases.45 It is submitted, however, that Mara-
thon accurately reflects the growing trend in the courts to prevent
interference with the offeror-shareholder relationship in the tender
offer context. In Marathon, the court distinguished the existing ar-
rangement and its incidental effect on the market from other op-
tions, commonly termed lock-ups.46 The options granted-a stock
option47 and a purchase option for Marathon's "crown jewel" oil
flelds' 5-were deemed to be individually sufficient to create an ar-
tificial ceiling on the value of Marathon's shares in the tender offer
43 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
44 Id. at 375.
45 See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.) (Mobil was
"an unwarranted extension of the Williams Act"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983); Note,
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 621,
622-23 (1983) (absent deception, material nondisclosure, or misrepresentation, lock-ups are
a breach of fiduciary duty claims); Note, supra note 5, at 281-82 (lock-ups should be evalu-
ated exclusively by business judgment analysis); Comment, Tender Offers, Lock-Ups and
the Williams Act: A Critical Analysis of Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 21 DUQ. L. Rav.
669, 706-07 (1983) (lock-ups should be reviewed under fiduciary standards).
46 See 669 F.2d at 374, 377. The Marathon court noted that the type of options granted
in the case had never before been put in issue in either the Supreme Court or any Court of
Appeals. Id. at 374. The court thus viewed the options as among the new techniques
designed to manipulate securities prices, for which the securities laws had been flexibly con-
structed. Id.
"I Id. at 367. The stock option granted in Marathon was an irrevocable option to
purchase 10 million authorized but unissued shares of Marathon's common stock for $90 per
share. Id. The 10 million shares were equivalent to approximately 17% of all outstanding
shares. Id.
48 Id. The option in Marathon was for the purchase of Marathon's 48% interest in the
oil and mineral rights in the Yates Field for $2.8 billion. Id. The power to exercise the
option was conditioned on failure of the grantee's offer and a third party's gaining control of
Marathon. Id. The Yates Field, admittedly Marathon's "crown jewel," was, by expert opin-
ion, capable of producing from two to five billion barrels of oil. Id. at 368. Although the
district court determined the option price of $2.8 billion to be fair, there was evidence that
the field might be worth over $3.6 billion. Id. at 375.
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market,49 and were, in fact, specifically designed for that purpose.5 0
The court reasoned that such intentional conduct, designed to "ar-
tificially affect securities markets," constituted manipulation in
light of the flexibility of the securities law to accomodate "'the full
range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate secur-
ities prices.' ,51 Similarly, the 200% stock option granted in Data
Probe unquestionably deterred further competition since its exer-
cise would have rendered meaningless a successful bid for the out-
standing shares by another offeror.52
Although the precedent set in Marathon has not been for-
mally adopted in any other jurisdiction, the "market approach"
philosophy5 3 adopted by the Third" and Fifth Circuits"5 and, most
4, Each of the options placed economically prohibitive restraints on competing bids. Id.
at 375. A competing bidder, in order to have been successful, would have had to have made
an offer on par with that of the grantee's, at the risk of losing Yates Field by exercise of the
option after having taken control Id. Thus, a bidder would have had to include the value of
Yates Field without any real hope of realizing the value paid. Id. The effects of the stock
option made a successful third-party bid equally unfeasible. Id. It was estimated that be-
cause of the option, a competing bidder would have had to have spent an additional 1.1 to
1.2 billion dollars to have matched the grantee's offer. Id. In addition, for every dollar in-
crease in the grantee's bid, the grantee's additional cost would have been $30 million, while
the cost to a third party would have been an additional $47 million. Id.
50 Id. at 374. The court determined that the "only effect" of the Yates Field option was
to terminate competitive bidding. Id. at 375.
81 Id. at 374 (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)).
'2 Even if a third-party offeror had received 100% of the outstanding shares on its bid,
CRC's exercise of its option to purchase 200% of the company's shares would have com-
pletely frustrated the takeover. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d
1, 3 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
83 The "market approach" philosophy contemplates that an investor, once provided
with full disclosure, will be free "to make an unfettered and knowledgeable choice" whether
to tender their shares to an offeror. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 189 (3d
Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
During deliberations on the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
Congress voiced continuing support of a governing market approach philosophy for the Wil-
liams Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976); 122 CONG. REc. 30877
(1976) (statement of Sen. Rodino). Senator Rodino noted with approval that the courts have
interpreted the Williams Act as affording protection for the shareholders' investment op-
tion. See 122 CONG. Rac. 30877 (1976).
" See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980). The Kennecott court
examined whether the New Jersey takeover law was preempted by the Williams Act, and
whether preliminary injunctive relief was warranted. Id. at 182. The court stated: "Delay
augments the possibility that the offer will not be completed successfully-not through ad-
verse action of the shareholders, as Congress contemplates, but through barriers erected by
the target management." Id. at 189. The court reversed a denial of injunction which the
lower court had based on a finding that no irreparable harm would result. Id. at 190. Re-
sponding to the lower court's reasoning that harm incident to delay was the sole threat of
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recently, by the Supreme Court,5 lends some support to the Sixth
Circuit's construction of section 14(e) manipulation.57 In addition,
a number of district courts have intimated acceptance of the Mar-
athon doctrine in dicta, yet have denied relief for claims of 14(e)
manipulation on facts that fall short of the unique circumstances
present in Marathon." For example, in Whittaker Corporation v.
harm to the plaintiffs, the Third Circuit stated that "this is precisely the harm that federal
policy does not tolerate." 637 F.2d at 190. The harm referred to was interference with the
investors' free choice. 637 F.2d at 189. Applying the court's rationale, it is submitted that
management activities that block shareholder free choice should be given the same analysis
as that applied by the Third Circuit to the New Jersey takeover laws.
55 See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). In Kidwell,
the court held an Idaho takeover statute violative of the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses.
Id. The Idaho statute required that target management be given advance warning of an
impending tender offer to permit delay of an offer's commencement by holding a "hearing."
Id. at 1278. In finding the statute preempted by the Williams Act, the court reasoned that
the pro-management Idaho statute gave the target defensive "weapons" with which to resist
a tender offer that were not similarly afforded the bidder. Id. Thus, the statute conflicted
with the Act's policy of equality. Id; see supra note 32. Further, the Fifth Circuit cited with
approval the district court's conclusion that the control of tender offers made possible by
the pro-management stance of the statute ran afoul of the primary goal of the Williams
Act-investor protection. 577 F.2d at 1278-79. It is suggested that an attempt by a state to
"tip the scales" in favor of management is analytically indistinguishable from a target's use
of defensive tactics to frustrate competitive bidding, and that such tactics should, therefore,
be considered an encroachment on the shareholder autonomy Congress endeavored to
maintain.
0 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1982). Adopting the market ap-
proach in its observation that "Congress intended for investors to be free to make their own
decisions," id. at 639, the Edgar Court designated "investor autonomy" as the primary in-
terest protected under the Williams Act, id. at 640. The Court recognized that the Williams
Act evinced a policy of "evenhandedness," so that an investor would be able to make his
own decisions without coercion from either management or offeror, id. at 634, and that the
Act further contained substantive protection sufficient to safeguard the investor in his deci-
sional capacity, id.; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
11 See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 911 nn.48-49 (Kidwell court applied "mar-
ket approach" to Williams Act-informed shareholder decision based on complete disclos-
ure as the basis for investor protection-rather than "fiduciary approach" of the Idaho take-
over statute, which protected investors only through regulation of the directors' fiduciary
duty to shareholders). Lynch and Steinberg contend that if "shareholders have a right to
hear a fair presentation of the material facts relating to a tender offer [in order to exercise
their ultimate right of decision], those rights are illusory if a target's management can avoid
liability by disclosing that they intend to deprive or impede the shareholders' opportunity
to consider an offer." Id. at 911 n.50. It is suggested that this same argument, made in the
context of a state takeover statute, see supra note 55, is applicable equally to the license to
engage in any kind of transaction with a bidder provided full disclosure is made that man-
agement has been afforded in Data Probe, see 722 F.2d at 4-5.
" See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 590 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (two-tier tender
offer and merger did not circumvent the forces of market demand); Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (distinguishable as
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Edgar°,9 an Ilinois district court determined that the sale of a sub-
sidiary by target management during a tender offer contest did not
create an artificial ceiling on market price, since further bids could
have been made for the corporation even without its subsidiary
once the sale had been consummated.60 In contrast, the purchase
option for corporate property in Marathon was contingent on a
third-party takeover.6 1 Implicit in the Whittaker opinion was the
rationale that had the defensive tactic locked up the competition
and imposed a price ceiling in the tender offer market, it would
have been prohibited as a manipulative practice.2
The Marathon court, however, did not analyze whether some
form of misrepresentation was necessary to support a claim of sec-
tion 14(e) manipulation.6 3 The necessity of proving misrepresenta-
tion, on the other hand, was the heart of the Data Probe analysis
and conclusion." An evaluation of whether an intent to mislead
investors is "an essential element of a cause of action under
proxy solicitation rather than tender offer); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 949
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (sale of subsidiary not designed solely for purposes of blocking normal,
healthy market activity); Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (plaintiff's claim of irreparable damage caused by withdrawal of offer was without
substance in light of more favorable subsequent offer). But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1983) (Marathon is an "unwarranted extension of Williams
Act"); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md. 1982) (Mara-
thon "exceptionally strained interpretation of Santa Fe"); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn,
537 F. Supp. 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Marathon's reasoning could unduly interfere with
right of target management to oppose in good faith a tender offer believed to be harmful).
19 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. IlM. 1982).
60 Id. at 949. The court determined that the sale of a substantial asset cannot be con-
strued as designed solely for the purpose of terminating market activity, since such a sale
could be characterized as part of healthy market activity due to the higher value that could
be received apart from bids. Id. Significantly, the court emphasized that there was no lock-
up involved since subsequent bids would be submitted for the corporation without the sub-
sidiary, rather than for the whole entity. Id.
61 See Marathon, 669 F.2d at 367.
62 See Whittaker, 535 F. Supp. at 949. The language employed by the court indicated
that if presented with an arrangement similar to that in Marathon, § 14(e) manipulation
would be found. Id. In this connection, the court stated: "Thus, the sale of Sherwood has
not created an artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market for Brunswick common
shares which would be a manipulative act in violation of the Williams Act." Id.
63 See Marathon, 669 F.2d at 374. The Marathon court quoted the Santa Fe formula-
tion of manipulation as conduct "intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting mar-
ket activity." See id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)). Never-
theless, the court characterized this formulation without reference to an intent to mislead,
stating: "[T]he Supreme Court has recently indicated that manipulation is an affecting of
the market for, or price of, securities by artificial means, i.e., means unrelated to the natural
forces of supply and demand." 669 F.2d at 374 (emphasis in original).
6 See Data Probe, 722 F.2d at 4.
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[s]ection 14(e)" 5 is, therefore, necessary to a proper defense of the
Marathon position.
Manipulation in the Tender Offer Context
The Data Probe decision essentially was a product of the
court's construction of manipulation.6 That construction, in turn,
was derived entirely from the Supreme Court's formulation of the
same term as used in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 7 Manipulation
was defined in Santa Fe Industries v. Green's in the "technical
sense of artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead
investors." 9 The Data Probe court, apparently relying on the
phrase "in order to mislead investors," held that misrepresentation
was essential to a 14(e) manipulation claim.70 Nevertheless, the
Santa Fe Court recognized that "nondisclosure is usually essential
to the success of a manipulative scheme. 7 It has been suggested
that this language indicates that there may be instances in which
certain devices or practices could be employed artificially to affect
securities markets without an accompanying intent to mislead in-
vestors.7 2  The tender offer presents just such a unique
opportunity.73
05 Id. at 4 (citing Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
951 (1980)).
See 722 F.2d at 4.
" See id.; supra note 23; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)
(manipulation in 10(b) context "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive
or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities"). It should
be noted that the Supreme Court limited its discussion of manipulation to dicta. See Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (10(b) does not regulate breach of fiduciary
obligation claims); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (scienter required for commission of 10(b)
violation).
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
69 Id. at 476.
70 See Data Probe, 722 F.2d at 4.
71 Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added). Professor Loss states: "[N]on-disclosure
of a manipulation is usually, if not invariably, essential to its success.. . ." 3 L. Loss,
SEcunrrIs REGULATION 1565 (1961). It is submitted that not even this language forecloses a
finding of manipulation within the tender offer context in the absence of an intent to mis-
lead. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
71 See Weiss, supra note 4, at 1097 (Santa Fe language implies that manipulative prac-
tices may occur in absence of deception); Note, supra note 42, at 23.
73 The tender offer is the only method of acquisition in which there is a direct transac-
tion between the shareholder and the acquiring corporation. Gilson, supra note 33, at 819;
Note, Golden Parachute Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of a
Tender Offer, 57 ST. JoHN's L. Rzv. 516, 516-17 & 516 n.2 (1983). In this regard, an inherent
conflict of interest arises for target management, faced with the dilemma of serving the best
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Bidders and management may observe the applicable disclos-
ure provisions of the Act, and at the same time engage in activity
that creates an artificial ceiling on the price of target stock. 4 For
example, target management may grant a lock-up option to one of
several bidders that may be exercised in the event of a competing
bidder's success. Potential bidders, resigning themselves to the fu-
tility of victory in the takeover battle, thus refrain from making an
offer, while those who were originally in the bidding drop out.75
Such an option forecloses a competitive market and removes any
possibility of shareholder decisionmaking. Thus, "manipulation"
occurs before the open view of all parties to the tender offer, and
with impunity. Such a result is not mandated by Santa Fe,7 and is
in patent derogation of the purpose and spirit of the Williams
Act.77 It is suggested, therefore, that, in the context of tender of-
fers, manipulation be construed in connection with the result in-
tended-artificially affecting market activity-not the means
chosen.
Further, courts and commentators have recognized that the
presence of manipulation in a transaction is grounded, not necessa-
rily in an intent to mislead, but in the creation of an artificial im-
pact on market activity such that the price per share does not "re-
flect the basic forces of supply and demand. '7 8 Indeed, it has been
interests of the corporation while desiring to perpetuate their position of corporate controL
Gilson, supra note 33, at 819-22; Weiss, Tender Offers and Management Responsibility, 23
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 445, 446-50 (1978). Whereas management maintains control over merg-
ers, consolidations, and sales of assets, see Gilson, supra note 33, at 843; Note, supra, at 516
n.1, tender offers serve as "the principal mechanism by which management can be forcibly
unseated from control," Gilson, supra note 33, at 819. Furthermore, shareholders generally
have a limited time in which to reach their decisions, see Weiss, supra, at 445 & n.1, and
must do so without the benefit of a prospectus, id. at 445 & n.2. These factors give rise to a
great potential for abuse in the takeover process by the parties involved, with the likelihood
that shareholders will he "treated as pawns in an elaborate game between the offerors and
the management." Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 184.
74 See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
75 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 375 (6th Cir. 1981) (extremely
favorable asset and stock lock-up options destroy any possibility that potential and incum-
bent bidders will compete for target shares); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc.,
568 F. Supp. 1538, 1541, 1543 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
76 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
78 Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972). The Cargill court did not mention an intent to mislead in its analysis, and focused
only on the conduct in question, stating "The methods and techniques of manipulation are
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asserted that the creation of an artificial price for shares in itself
provides the equivalent of deception-constructive fraud.79  Ac-
cording to this view, investors are deceived not by the price of the
shares set by the natural forces of the open market, but by the
conduct of the third party attempting to affect those prices.80
Moreover, it is suggested that applying a section 10(b) construction
of manipulation to section 14(e) may be inappropriate.,- Use of the
same or similar language in different sections of an act need not be
given the same interpretation when the statutory context and leg-
islative intent of the two sections differ.8 2 Whereas section 10(b)
limited only by the ingenuity of man. The aim must be therefore to discover whether con-
duct has been intentionally engaged in which has resulted in a price which does not reflect
basic forces of supply and demand." Id.; see also Note, supra note 42, at 247-52 ("creation
of an artificial market effect constitutes the true gravamen of the offense of manipulation").
7 Note, supra note 42, at 250-51. Relying on the common-law theory of manipulation
prior to adoption of the 1934 Act, as set forth in Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771, 775
(9th Cir. 1931), and United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d
321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935), the author states: "These two cases plainly
indicate that the fraud element of manipulation may be found in the absence of actual
nondisclosure, because the substitution of an artificially affected market for a natural one
'misleads and deceives' investors." Note, supra note 42, at 251.
80 See Note, supra note 42, at 251-52.
81 See 722 F.2d at 4 (" 'artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead inves-
tors'" (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977))). The Data Probe court
relied on Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1982), in holding that the
Santa Fe construction of manipulation was equally applicable to causes of action under
14(e). Data Probe, 722 F.2d at 4. Unfortunately, neither the Data Probe nor the Billard
court articulated any reason for engrafting a 10(b) interpretation of manipulation onto
14(e), see 722 F.2d at 4; 683 F.2d at 56, and, thus, arguably failed to take into account
differences in legislative purpose and statutory context between the two sections that may
make reliance on the Santa Fe construction definitive for all § 14(e) claims of manipulation
unjustified.
Because of language similarities between §§ 14(e) and 10(b), several courts have con-
strued them as in pari materia. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764 (8th
Cir. 1978); Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 696 (2d Cir.
1973); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). However, Professor Weiss
argues that manipulation should be construed to include practices that obstruct a free mar-
ket, and advocates that 10(b) not be deemed controlling for purposes of 14(e). See Weiss,
supra note 4, at 1097; infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
82 See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 461 n.230 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (pur-
poses underlying different sections of a statute in which the same word appears may require
different construction), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Bailey v. United States, 360 F.2d
113, 116 (9th Cir. 1966) (identical words in a statute need not be construed in par! materia
if such construction would frustrate congressional purpose); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v.
Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (S.D.N.Y.) (analysis of 10(b) manipulation does not
apply "with equal force to the Williams Act"), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Weiss, supra note 4, at 1097-98 (Santa Fe construction of manipula-
tion not controlling since decision rendered in 10(b) context). But see Fortin v. Marshall,
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provides for the regulation of trading markets,83 section 14(e) is
directed exclusively at tender offer regulation."' Section 14(e) af-
fords protection against proscribed conduct "in connection with
any tender offer."85 Section 10(b), however, reaches the broad
range of conduct that may occur "in connection with the purchase
or sale" of securities.8 " Thus, variations of purpose and scope be-
tween the two sections may make unwarranted a complete reliance
upon the dicta in Santa Fe.7
CONCLUSION
By rejecting the interpretation of section 14(e) proffered in the
Marathon decision, the Second Circuit strictly limited investor
protection under the provision to violations involving misrepresen-
tation. Such a restrictive meaning circumscribes both the purpose
of the "manipulative" clause and Congress' general intent in pro-
608 F.2d 525, 528 (lst Cir. 1979) (presumption exists that same meaning attaches to identi-
cal words in different sections of an act).
83 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
See supra note 2. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme
Court stated: "The legislative history thus shows that the sole purpose of the Williams Act
was the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer," id. at 35. The
Court's conclusion was premised on statements made by the Act's drafters. Id. at 26-29.
Senator Harrison Williams, the sponsor of the legislation, had enunciated the purpose of his
bill as "legislation [that] will close a significant gap in investor protection .... [by] re-
quirfing] full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time pro-
viding the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case." 113
CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); see supra notes 28-36 and accompa-
nying text.
85 See supra notes 2, 28-36.
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
81 Notwithstanding the different focus of the two provisions, some attention is merited
in regard to the spirit of § 10(b) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a whole in
determining the extent to which Congress sought to federalize securities regulation and, in
particular, market manipulation. Designed to "prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
nationally traded exchanges and markets," S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), the
1934 Act included provisions "aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which
have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful purpose," H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1934). The House Report refers broadly to those "devices [that] are employed for
the purpose of artificially raising or depressing security prices." H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934). Practices that were known to affect securities prices, such as "peg-
ging" and options, were made subject to manipulation claims as the Securities Exchange
Commission "deem[ed] necessary for the prevention of activities detrimental to the inter-
ests of investors." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1934). Thus, § 10(b) was desig-
nated a "catch-all clause," Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1976), in-
tended to prohibit intentional conduct by corporate insiders that interfered with investor
rights, see H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934), but which, significantly, did
not require an element of misrepresentation, id.
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viding for a regulatory scheme capable of embracing future devel-
opments that substantially frustrate the shareholders' freedom of
choice in their investment decisions. The acknowledgment by sev-
eral of the circuit courts, and, most notably, the Supreme Court,
that the Williams Act contemplates a market approach, suggests
support for the manipulation interpretation of Marathon.
This Comment has suggested that the courts should not re-
quire a showing of misrepresentation of a section 14(e) manipula-
tion claim. Tender offer transactions require this special treatment
because the parties involved may fully disclose their conduct, man-
ifest no deception whatever, and yet conclude agreements that ar-
tificially affect the market price of the target's shares and nullify
the independent decisionmaking of shareholders for whose benefit
the Williams Act was adopted.
Deborah Fanning
